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Abstract—Zero day Cyber-attacks created potential impacts
on the way information is held and protected, however one of
the vital priorities for governments, agencies and organizations
is to secure their network businesses, transactions and commu-
nications, simultaneously to avoid security policy and privacy
violations under any circumstances. Covert Channel is used
to in/ex-filtrate classified data secretly, whereas encryption is
used merely to protect communication from being decoded by
unauthorized access. In this paper, we propose a new Machine
Learning approach to detect covert channel implementing an
enhanced feature selection algorithm supporting Naive Bayesian
classifier. NBC is one of the most prominent classification al-
gorithm defining the highest probability in data mining area.
The proposed framework uses Intelligent Heuristic Algorithm
(IHA) to create novel primary training data, in addition to a
modified Decision Tree C4.5 technique to detect and classify
hidden channels in IPv6 network. The results showed better
detection performance and high accuracy in True Positive Rate
(TPR) and a low false negative rate (FNR) in comparison to other
previous techniques.
Keywords—CyberSecurity,Covert Channel, ICMPv6, IPv6,Naive
Bayes, Dicision Trees C4.5, MLA ,DARPA, NSL-KDD.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) as shown in Figure
1, expressly designed as a successor for IPv4. While the
protocol itself is already over a decade old but currently its
adoption’s infancy reaching 6.69% in the world. The low
acceptance of IPv6 results in an insufficient understanding
of its security properties as mentioned in [1], despite of the
security improvements, IPv6 had no cryptographic protection
when deployed and even the successful deployment of IPsec
within IPv6 would not give any guarantee or additional security
against hidden channel attacks [9].
Covert channels have been defined in many ways; Lampson
(1973) in [5] in was the first that recognized them as storage
channels between two systems, however these channels were
not meant to be used for communication. Then commonly
researchers defined them as enforced, illicit signalling channels
that allow a user to stealthily, contravene targeted objective in
[2],[4].
The protocol dimension representing the changed and new
fields values in pcap data according to the multi-level separa-
tion policy and unobservable requirements of any RFC 2460
as shown in Figure 2. These fields have potential to carry
covert channels depending on each fields modified values in
the packet transmission over the net as indicated in [1],[2],[4].
Fig. 1: IPv6 Header Format
There are two types of covert channels: storage and timing
in which categorized under two types of taxonomies: variable
and predictable according to our performed analysis and the
protocol’s RFCs standard values in [3],[4]. A predictable cover
means there is no variation, whereas a variable cover means
there is a limited variation.
Fig. 2: IPv6 PCAP Data in Header Fields
Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6)
as shown in Figure 3 is a vital component and an integral
part of IPv6 and must be fully implemented by every IPv6
node according to RFC 4443 in [1]. Table I shows examples
of possible IPv6 covert channels characteristics in ICMPv6.
ICMPv6 reports errors encountered in processing packets
[6],[8,] and it does other internet-layer functions such as
diagnostics. It produces two types of messages: Information
Notification and Error Notification using type and code fields
to differentiate services, in which both are vulnerable to; denial
of Service (DoS), Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) and spoofing
attacks [3],[10].
Each of these messages carries a next header value of 58,
which includes a Type value for message specification. The
Type ranges between (1-127) are for error messages and from
(128-255) are for information messages [2]. Having said that
and the arbitrary content of the ICMPv6 payload may carry
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different types of data according to the messages types and
ranges mentioned earlier, besides the Operating Systems type
used too [12].
However, sometimes ICMPv6 packet contains insignificant or
null values which indicate that potential covert channels could
be existed although ICMPv6 cannot do anything if the protocol
itself commits an error [4].
Fig. 3: ICMPv6 Header Format
TABLE I: IDENTIFIED COVERT CHANNELS IN IPV6
HEADER FIELDS
ID Field) Covert Channel Bandwidth
1 Traffic Class Set a false traffic class 8 bits/packet
2 Flow Label Set a false flow label 20 bits/packet
3 Payload Length Increase value to insert extra
data
Various
4 Next Header Set a valid value to add an
extra extension header
Various
5 Hop Limit Increase / decrease value ≈ 1 bit/packet
6 Source Address Set a false source address 16 bits/packet
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: section II
discusses the related work in two subsections; covert channels
detection in IPv6 including ICMPv6, and Nave Bayes Algo-
rithm. Section III discusses the proposed framework, section
IV discusses the experiments and initial results obtained from
the testing phases, and finally section V discusses Conclusion
and Future work. Our proposed system offers a better perfor-
mance in high accuracy and prediction of the future unknown
attacks against legitimate targets.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Detection Techniques
Previous researchers in network covert channels focused
on IPv4 [2],[4],[6], however fewer researchers concerned in
the security vulnerabilities of the new generation IPv6 due to
its incomplete implementation. Hidden information could be
transferred very easy in the data section of the packet due
to the large size and relatively unstructured in comparison to
headers fields. Covert channels could be encoded in the unused
or reserved bits in the packet header frame, these unused
header fields are designed for future protocol improvements,
and mostly they are dismissed by IDS and Firewalls [14],[17]
furthermore this exception caused by the in-existence of spe-
cific values in protocol standards [8],[9].
Handel and Sandford in [1] proposed a covert channel
exploiting the unused bits of the type of service (TOS) IP
header or the Flags field in TCP header. Ahsan and Kundur
in [2] suggested five hidden channels approaches manipulating
the headers in TCP, IGMP and ICMP and one of them in packet
sorting within the IPsec protocol. Hintz in [1],[9] proposed to
use the Urgent Pointer in TCP to transmit covert data. Lucena
et al in [1] suggested a number of covert channels in IPv6
header fields hence time consumption and the complexity of
the process was noticed in attempted approach.
Rowland proposed in [2] a method to multiply each byte of
the hidden data by 256 and use it directly as IP ID meanwhile
the IP identification header field is used for reassembling
fragmented IP packets. The main requirement from RFC 0791
for the IP standard is that IP packet is uniquely identified by IP
ID for a certain temporary time [9],[10]. Rutkowska proposed
a developed covert channel using TCP ISNs for Linux using
encryption [2],[9]. Furthermore, Murdoch and Lewis [1],[2]
proposed different idea about ISN covert channels.
Qu et al [6] suggested a technique for covert information
to be embedded into the Time to Live (TTL) and the Hop
Limit field so as Lucena in [1]. Zander et al in [2] analysed
both proposed initial TTL values, which is out of our research
scope.
Sohn et al in [13] mentioned the Support Vector Machine
in passive warden to detect TCP covert channels within the
IP ID and TCP ISN. This method is not preferable for well
understood and explicit features in his proposed IP IDs and
ISNs steganography covert channels, furthermore SVM can
only identify simple aspects as its unlikely to detect complex
structure deployed in TCP/IP fields and their interdependencies
[8].
Project Loki suggested exploring the concept of ICMP
tunneling in [9],[17] by using covert channels through the
data portions of the ICMP ECHO and ICMP ECHOREPLY
packets. Frikha and Trabelsi in [4] suggested a complex theory
in triple processes within one security system, theoretically the
approach was effective but it was not fully implemented.
B. Naive Bayes Algorithm
NBA is a simple probabilistic classifier applying Bayes
theorem but with a strong independence assumptions, which
called class conditional independence because it assumes that
an effect of an attributes value on a given class is independent.
It allows the representation of dependencies among subsets
of attributes; therefore, NBA is the fastest learning algorithm
examining all its training inputs [12],[14,[18]. Let say Ck, C
representing a class type with subset k as an attribute in which
needs to be classified. Each class should have a probability de-
noted P (Ck) that represents the prior probability of classifying
an attribute into Ck, meanwhile the value that Ck has, will be
estimated from the training dataset. Let say that an attribute
such as n values, Xn, so the objective of classification is
quite clearly to estimate and find the conditional probability of
P (Ck|X1, X2, X3, ..Xn) therefore the probability is calculated
according to Bayes rule:
P (Ck | X) = P (X | Ck)P (Xk)
P (X)
(1)
We can write this rule as below:
P (Ck|Xn) = (X1, X2, Xn|Ck)P (Ci)/P (X1, X2, Xn)
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
New attempts required to detect storage covert channel
in IPv6 using advanced MLA in respond to the novel vul-
nerabilities in this protocol. This approach could act as a
countermeasure restrain to sophisticated attack tools used by
hackers.
Using supervised Machine Learning to tackle such network
threats in IPv6 will add a new rout of cutting-edge solutions
for security systems.
Most of the existing methods in [1]-[4] dealing with IPv6
covert channels have the following issues [8]:
• Approaches are complicated using complex algorithms
to detect encrypted covert channels.
• Creating traffic congestion while processing.
• Time consumption in online detection
• Few parameters are considerable while dealing with
covert channels.
Fig. 4: Simulation of Covert Channels in LAN Topology
Various approaches existed for anomaly detection: signa-
ture, behaviour and protocol based detection; few researchers
used machine-learning technique to tackle covert channels
in IPv6 and ICMPv6 due to the complexity. Our approach
uses pattern behaviour of the header value to determine the
identification that covert data has been transferred without
affecting the normal communication. In the first step of the
proposed framework, we designed and configured a separate
LAN as shown in Figure 4 for IPv6 according to the network
system environment. A Security tool was created along with
The Hacker Choice (THC) in [16] to simulate different attacks
using ten fields to embed covert channels in both protocols
IPv6 and ICMPv6 [3],[8]. The framework consists of five
modules as shown in Figure 5:
1) Capture Raw Data: Jpcap library packet sniffer is a
Java API used to capture packets for 3 minutes.
2) Covert channel Analysis: Input pcap data go through
field selection and the following sub steps:
a) Packet Transformation:data needs to be trans-
formed into numeric values in order to be
compatible input for NBC.
b) Packet Normalization: data need to be nor-
malized in order to enhance the performance
of the detection and create a consistency for
the values.
c) Packet Discretization: data needs to be dis-
cretized to create a consistency value type of
the fields to facilitate feature selection.
Fig. 5: Proposed Covert Channel Detection Framework in IPv6
3) Data Pre-processing: the input of this module is the
selected fields with their values. Here we run an In-
telligent Heuristic Algorithm (IHA) to create training
dataset referring to the Request for Comments (RFC)
and Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)
rules. The output is the clear formatted data into two
classes numerically 1 and 0, 1 is covert and 0 is
normal. The classes consist of attributes with sub-set
various values depending on each attributes holding
type.
4) Classification and Detection step: feature selection is
needed to prune classes and remove the unwanted
repetitive data types, a modified C4.5 is used with
ratio gain to enable the training data as an input into
the NBC. Two classes will be achieved in the output
data, covert in which classified as an attack, and a
normal class.
5) Decision step: the passive warden can take different
actions such as: block, audit or limit the bandwidth
of the connection as a part of mitigation security
process.
A. Building the Classifier
The proposed Nave Bayes Classifier (NBC) is to improve
the performance of the classification process by eliminating
the irrelevant or the monotonous attributes from the captured
dataset, then only tackling the most informative sub-values
in the classification task. For the classification process, the
denominator is irrelevant, since it will have the same value
when for attribute values of the Xj as it is the same regardless
of the value of Ck, The central assumption of Nave Bayesian
classification is that every value in Xj within each class is
independent from each other. Next, we get by applying the
independent probability rule:
P (X1 all left values of Xj = P (X1 | Ck) (2)
And therefore:
P (X1, X2, Xn|Ck) = P (X1|Ck)P (X2|Ck), .P (Xn|Ck) (3)
So each factor of the right hand of the equation possible to be
determined from the training data because of the random Ki.
Then we can say from equation 2 we get:
P (Xi|Ck) ≈ [(#Xi ∧ Ck)/[(#Ck)] (4)
Where # represents the number of such occurrences in the
training set data. Therefore, the classification of the test
set can now estimate by: P (Ck|X1)X2.Xn) so this will be
proportional to:
P (Ck)P (X1|Ck)P (X2|Ck)P (X3|Ck)P (Xn|Ck) (5)
Let’s apply this to our existing data, first we have categorized
our training data characteristics into 6 main attributes as shown
in Table I plus 4 additional attributes as shown in Table II.
Let’s assume Xi represents an attribute with its subset here
subset i is the value held by each attribute X1, X2, Xn, each
group of attributes have been given a class Ck in which has
a prior probability of classifying the attribute into Xi which,
represent the value created by training data set. Bayes classifier
will predict the class according to the higher probability
(likelihood) which taken by an attribute to find the conditional
probability of P (Ck|givenX1andX2andX3...andXn).
B. Data Pre-Processing
1) Data Collection: The explicit unreachability of bench-
mark data on covert channels attacks calls for creating new
models for IPv6 Intrusion detection systems. In our approach,
we create primary data through simulation of different known
and unknown attacks on the suggested IPv6 LAN topology
suing a security tool to perform these attacks. Different attacks
were simulated using covert data in the IPv6 header. Table
II shows the pre-processed output data format used into NB
classification and Figure 6 shows the data set format with
classified class.
TABLE II: COVERT CHANNELS DATA FORMAT AND
VALUES
ID Header Attribte Value Type Class
1 Traffic Class numeric normal or covert
2 Flow Label numeric normal or covert
3 Hop Limit high, low, moderate normal or covert
4 Payload Length Increase, decrease, low normal or covert
5 Source Address numeric normal or covert
6 Next Header numeric normal or covert
7 ICMPv6 Type numeric normal or covert
8 ICMPv6 Code numeric normal or covert
9 Reserve Bit numeric normal or covert
10 ICMPv6 Payload numeric normal or covert
We performed different simulations of various attacks, and
then captured the raw data processed through field selection.
We used two processes of selection: field selection prior to
the data pre-processing phase, and feature selection post pre-
processing phase.
The input here will be the captured pcap packets and should
be filtered, transformed and discretized then pre-processed to
create the needed training dataset; this is done by applying the
Intelligent Heuristic Algorithm (IHA).The output is formatted
according to the suggested classification technique, in our case;
we need an Attribute Relation File Format (ARFF) containing
three headers; attribute, value and class as shows in Table II .
Fig. 6: Data Set Format Before Classification
C. Feature Selection Algorithm
1) Data Trees C.45: Feature selection is the most criti-
cal step in building security system models it reduces data
complexity and computational time and efforts. There are two
methods [12]: filter method and wrapper method, the filter
method uses measures such as information, consistency or
distance to compute the relevance of set of features while the
wrapper predicts the accuracy of a classified as a mean to
evaluate and assess the goodness of a feature set.
In this approach, we use a modified C4.5 technique. C4.5
is a popular method for inductive inference as it tolerate noisy
data and has the capability to learn disjunctive expressions.
It is a greedy algorithm and constructs the decision trees
in a top-down recursive divide-and-conquer manner. Decision
Trees considered as non-parametric estimator that reasonably
approximate any function according to the increase size of
the training or testing dataset, so using Nave Bayes Classifier
would improve the performance in a better result.
2) Information Gain Algorithm: In order to select the best
test attributes we need to work out the entropy measurement
to calculate the purity in an arbitrary collection of examples.
Let S be a set of consisting of s data samples. Suppose that the
class label attributes has m distinct values defining m distinct
classes Ck. Moreover, let Si be the number of samples of S in
class Ck, so we need to classify the expected information as
follow:
I(S1, S2, ..., Sm) = −
m∑
k=1
Pk log(Pk) (6)
Where Pk is the probability that an arbitrary sample belongs
to class Ck and estimated by Sk/S. Let attribute A obtains x
as distinct values, a1, a2, , ax. We can use attribute A to split
S into x subsets S1, S2, .Sx, where Si contains the samples
in S which have the value of aj of A. Then let Skj be the
sample numbers of class Ck in a subset Sj . So the entropy in
which the expected information in the splitting subsets by A
will give:
E(A) =
v∑
j=1
(S1j + ...+ Smj )
S
(7)
In order to work out the weight, we assume the term
(S1j+...+Smj )
S to be the (j
th) subset and it the number of
samples in the devided subset by total number of samples in
S as in equation (5). For a given subset Sj ,
I(S1j, S2j, ..., Smj) = −
m∑
k=1
Pkj log2(Pkj) (8)
Where Pkj = Skj/Sj and it is the probability in which any
sample of Sj would belong to class Ck. This will make the
entropy value zero if the sample is pure as all samples. S
should belong to one class, and the entropy has a maximum
positive value such as:1. When the sample occasionally is
impure and it could contain some negative and positive sub-
value examples also. Finally, the information gain expression
would be achieved by:
InformationGain(A) = I(S1, S2, ..., SM )E(A) (9)
So here, we choose the attribute with the highest information
gain to test the current node. In order to avoid focusing only
on attributes with many values rather than attributes with few
values we need to modify the C4.5 techniques with another
alternative measurement called Information Gain Ratio (IGR)
which, maximizes the probabilities of considering each value
of any attribute no matter how many values can have. This split
of the information takes into account that an attribute having
many values like:
SplitInformation(A) = −
x∑
j=1
Sj
S
log2
Sj
S
(10)
Finally, we work out the gain ratio and calculate as below:
GainRatio(A) =
InformationGain(A)
SplitInformation(A)
(11)
IV. EXPERIMENT AND RESULT DISCUSSION
The primary dataset in this experiment was obtained from
a generated script simulating attacks on a separated IPv6
LAN network environment from the internet. Due to ethical
issues concerning Data Protection Act 1998 realistic attacks
are illegal. However, the IPv6 simulated topology as shown
in Figure 4 configured successfully. After sunning the pro-
posed processes step 1-3 The training dataset was created and
streamed into the classification model using Weka 3.7 java built
database system. We performed two phases of experiments
using two types of training dataset: in phase one we used our
primary dataset to elaborate the accuracy and the performance
improvement of the suggested model:
• Phase 1: The primary data set used as a training
dataset in the first attempt consisted of 10.000 in-
stances and we performed classification types: covert
(anomaly) and normal as shown in Figure 6. The
simulated attacks should fall in one of the following
four types of attacks:
1) Probe
2) Denail of Service (DoS)
3) Covert Channel: ICMPv6 covert channel,
Flow label, hop-by-hop, and Traffic class
covert channels.
4) Root to Local (R2L).
TABLE III: ACCURACY OF DIFFERENT DETECTION
TECHNIQUES
Classifier Accuracy(%) TPR FPR Precision Model Built
Nave+Bayes 76.650 0.766 0.234 1.000 0.22
NBC+InfoGain 65.86 0.833 0.380 0.827 0.18
Suggested NBC 94.47 0.985 0.015 0.960 0.15
NBC+SubsetEval 55.32 0.810 0.319 0.274 0.25
For the supervised learning algorithm, we used the learning
dataset created by IHA with the characteristic described in
Table I and table II. The training dataset contained 11 attributes
or features including the one target value or labelled class
Fig. 7: Performance of The Proposed Model
either normal or covert (attack) in order to build the detection
system. Then we performed 10 fold cross validation to test the
efficiency of the built model through the training phase. We
performed all experiments in Windows 7 OS platform, CPU
Core i5 processor, with 8 GB RAM. The initial result of the
phase one testing shown in Table III.
Fig. 8: Precision Rates of The Suggested Model
• Phase 2: In order to extend the proficiency of the pro-
posed model, we used the DARPA 1999 IDS dataset
[15]. This dataset was collected at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) in Lincoln Lab to
evaluate intrusion detection systems, however it lacks
instances of IPv6 attack types except the ICMPv4, and
IP ID covert channels [14] that has similar techniques
principles manipulating such attacks. McHugh and
Mahoney in [11],[15] criticized the DARPA dataset
for not containing some background noise i.e. packet
storms, strange packets, etc.
This dataset has binary class attribute along with numerous re-
alistic numbers of training and test instances that simplifies our
experiment in this paper. Each connection record consists of 41
features and labelled in order sequences such as: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7...
41 and falls into four main categories:
1) Cat 1 (1-9): Contains features of individual TCP
connections.
2) Cat 2 (10-22): Contains features within a connection
suggested by domain knowledge.
3) Cat 3 (23-31): Contains traffic features computed
using two-second time windows.
4) Cat 4 (32-41): Contains traffic features computed
using a two-second time window from destination to
host.
Ciza in [15] described the features and values of NSL-KDD99
cup including a version of DARPA 1999 dataset attacks types.
The DARPA training dataset gave a slightly higher detection
rate than our primary captured data in comparison to other
techniques used in the process as shown in Table IV. The
second phase with 10 folds resulting a lower false rate and a
higher detection rate so far.
TABLE IV: PERFORMNCE OF NBC IN COMPARISON
TO OTHER TECHNIQUES
Classifier Accuracy(%) TPR FPR Precision Model Built
Nave+Bayes 80.04 0.802 0.198 0.907 0.27
NBC without FS 93.67 0.939 0.013 0.939 0.23
Suggested NBC 96.46 0.945 0.012 0.989 0.20
NBC+SubsetEval 96.55 0.948 0.014 0.987 0.25
A. Discussion
The results of both experiments confirm the initial hy-
pothesis in which our NBCs performance is impressive with
regards to the significant accuracy of each classifier in separate
testing phases so far. In Table III and Figure 7, we observe
the distinguished correctness and low false positive of the
suggested classifier. The suggested decision tree C4.5 created
a positive impact along with Nave Bayes algorithm on the
detection rate as shown in Table III.
The NBC is fastest among other classifiers because fewer
attributes are involved in learning, furthermore and the time
that our proposed NBC spent in building the data model is 0.15
milliseconds, is obviously less than other used techniques.
To see a better performance of NBC, we performed another
experiment on the original dataset with 10 attributes using
Nave Bayes classifier once, and with Subset Evaluation Tech-
nique in a second run; the results were significantly obvious as
shown in Table III. The modified feature selection technique
offered a higher prediction rate in detection process as shown
in Figure 7, in addition to creating an impact on the precision
rate of the proposed method as shown in Figure 8.
Fig. 9: Performance of the proposed Model Using DARPA
The DARPA dataset has extraordinary huge amount of
data so we had to cut 10(%) of the whole dataset to create
testing dataset with 41 attributes in order to see the accuracy
performance of the proposed method. NBC performance also
potential in phase 2 despite of using more instances than the
original dataset as shown in Figure 9.
Finally Table IV and Figure 10 show the accuracy of the
detection rate in using NBC which is (96.46%) and potentially
higher than using other techniques as well as the time elapsed
in building the data model is 0.20 milliseconds.
Fig. 10: Precision Rates of the Suggested Model Using DARPA
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
A new hybrid method in feature selection that uses C4.5
decision trees with Information gain technique is presented.
This method is used to classify and detect covert channels in
IPv6 improving the Nave Bayes learning algorithm.
This proposed approach implementing an enhanced feature
selection technique.i.e C4.5 decision trees with Information
Gain heterogeneously reduces the probabilistic stimulation,
which leads to higher accuracy in detection and classification
process, consequently leads to lower false negative rate (FNR)
and higher true positive rate (TPR). The reason behind this
result is that we reduced the entropy and the noisy data in both
training datasets: Our Original primary data and the DARPA
1999 dataset which led to pure data pruning and significant
compatible data as shown in Figure 6.
Future work is further planned to examine the weighting
and ranking of the features selected in the primary dataset of
the IPv6 and its attacks captured packets. In addition to the
ranking trees process, using more different advanced feature
selection algorithms is planned to be investigated too.
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